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Abstract The sensorimotor approach to perception addresses various aspects of per-
ceptual experience, but not the subjectivity of intentional action. Conversely, the
problem that current accounts of the sense of agency deal with is primarily one of
subjectivity. But the proposed models, based on internal signal comparisons, arguably
fail to make the transition from subpersonal computations to personal experience. In
this paper we suggest an alternative direction towards explaining the sense of agency
by braiding three theoretical strands: a world-involving, dynamical interpretation of the
sensorimotor approach, an enactive description of sensorimotor agency as contrasted
with organic agency in general, and a dynamical theory of equilibration within and
between sensorimotor schemes. On this new account, the sense of oneself as the author
of one’s own actions corresponds to what we experience during the ongoing adventure
of establishing, losing, and re-establishing meaningful interactions with the world. The
meaningful relation between agent and world is given by the precarious constitution of
sensorimotor agency as a self-asserting network of schemes and dispositions. Acts are
owned as they adaptively assert the constitution of the agent. Thus, awareness for
different aspects of agency experience, such as the initiation of action, the effort exerted
in controlling it, or the achievement of the desired effect, can be accounted for by
processes involved in maintaining the sensorimotor organization that enables these
interactions with the world. We discuss these processes in detail from a non-represen-
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1 Introduction
Embodied accounts of motor control and perceptual experience fall within one of two
categories according to the explanatory role they give to the agent’s body and to the
world. In-the-head approaches put the emphasis on computational processes occurring
in the agent’s brain that instantiate internal models of body and world. Such models can
be affected by environmental events, sensorimotor regularities, and body dynamics in a
limited way: either in the form of informational inputs or via the ‘formatting’ of internal
representations. In-the-head explanations are subpersonal and internalist. World-
involving approaches, in contrast, see brain, body, and world as part of an entangled
relational network of processes in which both neural, non-neural, and non-biological
elements can play strong causal and constitutive roles – not just informational or
developmental ones – in action and perception. The explanatory strategy in such cases
require establishing links between the personal-level relation between agent and envi-
ronment as well as the dynamic coupling of subpersonal processes in the agent and in
the environment.
The most popular accounts of the sense of agency, the experience of being the
author and initiator of our own actions, are in-the-head approaches. They involve
comparisons between intended and actual states of the body and the world, as if
experiencing oneself to be the agent of an action were first and foremost a
question of verifying whether these states match or not. Our objective in this
paper is to introduce a world-involving alternative account based on O’Regan and
Noë’s (2001) sensorimotor (SM) approach to perception; more specifically based
on recent formalizations of this proposal (Buhrmann et al. 2013; Di Paolo et al.
2014). This alternative does not see the sense of agency as just an epistemological
problem, but rather assumes that it is an intrinsic aspect of how sensorimotor
schemes are organised and enacted in the world.
A sense of the bodily self as an agent, in this view, corresponds to what we
experience during the ongoing adventure of establishing, losing, and re-
establishing meaningful relations between ourselves and the world. This is what
an enactive account of the sense of agency should endeavour to explain by
articulating in operational terms what these meaningful relations consists of, as
well as what it means to establish them or to lose them. To do so we need to
elaborate further links between the sensorimotor approach and enactive ideas
(Di Paolo and Thompson 2014; McGann et al. 2013; Thompson 2007; Varela
et al. 1991), in particular by extending the account of minimal agency provided
by Barandiaran et al. (2009) to the sensorimotor realm. The latter step enables
us to address an issue unsolved by the SM approach thus far, namely the
problem of why the enactment of sensorimotor contingencies should be accom-
panied by any subjective perspective at all, and what sorts of systems are able
to enjoy subjective experiences.
We propose that the various aspects of the phenomenology of the sense of agency
relate to both the intrinsic and the relational (meta)stability of the action/perception
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schemes that together constitute the sensorimotor level of agency. These intrinsic and
relational aspects always involve the world in some non-trivial sense and do not require
internal comparison between neural signals as the epistemic signature of a controlled
act. Instead, the enacted schemes Bbelong^ to the agent to the extent that they assert her
agency in the first place. This is manifested in different forms: as feelings of action
initiation, of action control, of effort and control exertion by the various ways and
degrees in which an enacted scheme is met with, and surpasses (or not), obstacles and
resistance both internally within a given act and relationally between acts.
Our enactive account of the sense of agency is situated at the meso-level between
neurodynamics and personal experience. In developing it, we follow the general
research direction of neurophenomenology (Varela 1995, 1999; see also Gallagher
1997; Lutz and Thompson 2003) according to which phenomenological descriptions
of lived experience and naturalistic explanations are contrasted in order to uncover their
mutual constraints and compatibilities. As a matter of convenience, we will often talk
about Bexplanations^ or Baccounts^ of the sense of agency. The use of this terminology
should not be understood as an attempt to reduce experiential aspects to naturalistic
processes, but as an effort to provide a neurophenomenologically coherent story. We
also follow Beaton (2013) in acknowledging that, pace the label, neurophenomenology
need not be restricted to neural processes, but may involve complex linkages between
brain, body, and world. In short, neurophenomenology can be world-involving.
In the following section we review the phenomenology of the sense of agency as
well as key findings and concepts concerning its normal and pathological aspects.
Section 3 describes and criticises the comparator model, currently the most wide-
spread explanation of the sense of agency. Before detailing our alternative theory, we
provide the necessary background for its key elements in section 4. This requires
reviewing some recent theoretical developments in the sensorimotor approach, intro-
ducing the enactive notion of sensorimotor agency, and summarizing our dynamical
theory of equilibration within and between sensorimotor schemes. Based on this, we
develop in section 5 a new proposal for a world-involving account of the sense of
agency.
2 The phenomenology of agency
In everyday life, when I engage in intentional actions, these are usually accompanied
by an experience that I am their author or initiator, in other words, by an awareness that
the actions are mine, and that I have caused them. Upon reflection, and based on
empirical data which we summarize below, this sense of agency is not a unique and
unified sense. Rather, one can distinguish different levels of action awareness, and
various aspects of one’s agency at which this awareness can be directed.
We should note, before continuing, that the phenomenology of agency is itself a
hotly debated topic. Not only do researchers disagree on its level of explicitness, or the
mechanisms giving rise to it, some also flatly deny the existence of any distinct
experience beyond the level of conscious intentions and expectations in one’s actions.
We will come back to this in the discussion. For now, we will take the following
account of agency experience as a starting point and will show how an enactive
approach to sensorimotor agency may shed light on its origin.
The enactive sense of agency
2.1 Pre-reflective and reflective sense of agency
At a general level we can distinguish between a pre-reflective and a reflective self-
awareness in action (Gallagher 2007, 2012). The former, also referred to as the feeling
of agency (Synofzik et al. 2007, 2008), is the experience of agency that accompanies
my actions when I’m immersed in my activity, without paying particular attention to or
consciously reflecting on the details of what I’m doing at the moment or why. At this
level, my agency is not given to me explicitly as an object of experience, it is rather
implicit in the unperturbed flow of my action and the egocentric perspective underlying
it. It is the basic, diffuse feeling that it is I who is carrying out an activity, but the I here
is implicit in the non-transitive experience of myself as the locus of agency. It is
phenomenologically recessive in the sense that in normal circumstances I am primarily
aware of what I’m doing, rather than the fact that it is I who is doing it. Often we
become consciously aware only of the absence of the feeling of agency when being
interrupted while immersed in a task, or when unexpectedly failing in some way.
We can also experience ourselves reflectively as agents when taking an introspective
stance that is detached from our ongoing activity. For example, when deliberating and
planning actions we are about to take, or when explicitly monitoring the success of our
actions, we may judge ourselves to be responsible when the actions are consistent with
our personal beliefs, or when the task results in the achievement of a goal I have set to
myself. This sense of agency is usually conceived as a higher-order, conceptual
attribution, and a transitive experience of myself as object, i.e. as he who is acting.
The two forms of agency experience are separable. This is demonstrated, for
example, in anarchic hand syndrome (Marcel 2003; Marchetti and Della Sala 1998;
Pacherie 2007a), one of several symptoms involving a disturbed sense of agency.
Patients with certain types of neurological damage, who with their contra-lesional hand
perform complex, well-formed and intentional (goal-oriented) actions in response to
environmental cues, such as operating a doorknob or scribbling with a pencil (Frith
2005), report that these actions are independent of their will, i.e. as if they occurred
involuntarily. Of particular interest is the case of a man who disowned the anarchic
actions that his hand was performing, reporting that he was not doing them, yet
maintained Bof course I know that I am doing it. It just doesn’t feel like me^ (Marcel
2003, p. 79, emphasis ours). Based on such observations, Marcel argues that the person
with anarchic hand Bis often clear that their experience of the action as disowned is a
‘seeming’^ (ibid.), which illustrates how the first-order feeling of agency, and the
second-order judgment of agency are indeed separate processes, and that they may
come apart, at least in pathological cases.
2.2 Aspects of pre-reflective agency experience
Before elaborating on the different aspects of actions that one can be aware of, and
which may contribute to the overall feeling of agency, we should separate the sense of
agency as described above from the sense of ownership (Gallagher 2000; Synofzik
et al. 2008). The latter is the pre-reflective experience that it is me, i.e. my body, that is
moving, or more generally, that a given body part belongs to me. In everyday voluntary
activity these two aspects contribute to a unified, minimal self-awareness for action.
That they are nevertheless distinct phenomenological aspects is revealed, for example,
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in involuntary movements. In such cases, e.g. when being pushed, I may lack a sense of
having initiated the movement, or of controlling it, yet I may still have the sense that it
is me who is moving.
2.2.1 Intentional and movement-related aspects
Under normal conditions our own agency tends to present itself as a unified experience.
I may or may not feel as if I am the author of my actions, but usually this feeling does
not present itself in varying shades or qualities, in the same manner, say, that the visual
appearance of a surface may differ in terms of perceived light intensity, colour, texture,
and so on. However, experimental manipulation and phenomenological analysis reveal
that there are multiple different aspects that can contribute to the overall feeling of
agency.
Gallagher (2007, 2012), for example, distinguishes intentional aspects involved in
the sense of agency from those related to the initiation of movement. The distinction is
motivated by the observation that in the case of involuntary movements I have a sense
of ownership only (but not agency), which is based on afferent sensory feedback (e.g.
proprioceptive and kinaesthetic). What is different in the sense of agency during
voluntary movements, is the presence of efferent signals sent to the motor systems. A
series of experiments reported by Tsakiris and Haggard (2005) highlight the role of
efferent signals in the sense of agency during movement initiation. Using an indepen-
dent manipulation of efferent and afferent signals (e.g. arm movements executed
voluntarily vs. involuntarily), the authors show that the presence of efferent motor
signals is important, for example, to attenuate the sensory consequence of self-
generated movements (even when the consequences cannot in principle be predicted),
or to distinguish between one’s own hand passively moving, and that of an experi-
menter performing the same movement.
Another element of agency experience that is related primarily to bodily movement
rather than the intentional aspect of action, is the sense of being in control of ongoing
movements, as distinct from the sense of having initiated them. De Vignemont and
Fourneret (2004) describe pathological cases where the two aspects are differentially
affected. For instance, patients with anosognosia for plegia (unawareness or denial of
paralysis) may believe that they have raised their hand, even though they suffer from a
condition preventing them from voluntarily initiating any movement with the affected
limb., i.e. their sense of initiation is disrupted. In contrast, deafferented patients who do
not receive any tactile or proprioceptive feedback have no sense (other than visual) of
their own movement or body position, yet they know perfectly well whether or not they
are moving.
Intentionality enters into the phenomenology of agency awareness in two ways. The
first is the feeling that not only have I initiated a certain action, but that my initiating it
is in accordance with my intention to do so. Patients with schizophrenic delusions of
control, for example, seem to have a perturbed sense of the latter kind. The symptoms
in this condition are in some respects similar to anarchic hand, in that patients will
report not to be the agent of movements they are carrying out. But the two conditions
are different in crucial ways. In anarchic hand, patients often carry out actions that are
against their conscious will. They will recognise this and try to stop them. Patients with
delusions of control, in contrast, often continue to make the movements they intended,
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such as when following the instructions of an experimenter. They moreover seem to
have awareness of the intentions underlying their movements, since they do not try to
stop or correct them. Yet, they insist that their movements are being controlled by
external forces, reporting to believe, for example, somebody has implanted a computer
in their brain that is making them move, or feeling as if being steered around (Frith
et al. 2000b). These patients are aware of their intentions, and of the movement as it
occurs (as well as having a sense of ownership), but not of having initiated it. Patients
seem to experience a feeling of somebody anticipating their actions (reading their
intentions), and initiating them without their intervention (ibid.). Delusions of control
thus illustrate how the willing of an action and its initiation are separable aspects that
can be experienced independently.
A second intentional aspect of agency awareness relates to the desired outcome of an
action. An inherent property of intentional actions is that they are directed at achieving
a meaningful effect. The extent to which I am successful in achieving this effect can
enter as another element in my agency experience. Since the success of my action
usually requires certain outcomes in the world, it is not surprising that this experience
depends to a greater extent on the ability to monitor distal action effects, rather than
internal processes and signals. As a result, action-effect awareness seems to be easily
manipulated and can be falsely induced, even in non-pathological situations. In exper-
iments by Wegner and Wheatley (1999), for example, subjects report to have authored
an action even if the corresponding movement had in fact been produced by another
participant sharing the control device, and simply because the subject had been exposed
to a movement-congruent word just prior to the movement. This sense of agency relies
on the perceived contingency between mental states and action effects. As long as the
action outcome is consistent with one’s intention, follows the intention within a certain
time window, and there is no other conspicuous cause, then the action can be experi-
enced as intended and effectuated by oneself.
What is the relationship between the different aspects of pre-reflective action
awareness? It is clear that under normal circumstances we do not experience these
aspects in isolation. They rather seem to enter into a unified, qualitative and diffuse
sense that it is I who is in control of my actions. Moreover, as Marcel (2003) argues,
few if any of the individual aspects seem to be necessary for the experience of agency.
For example, neither a sense of ownership based on proprioceptive awareness, nor
(conscious) awareness of the reasons for our actions seem to be required in order to feel
that we are performing intentional actions (e.g. anarchic hand). At the same time, most
of the different aspects may be sufficient on their own to create a sense of agency. For
example, merely being aware of one’s intention to move (or of one’s attempt to initiate
a motor response), can be sufficient to feel that one is engaged in action, as is the case
in anosognosia for plegia. Like Marcel, Gallagher (2007, 2012) as well as Synofzik
et al. (2007, 2008) therefore defend a view of the sense of agency as involving a
complex integration of afferent, efferent, and intentional feedback.
3 The comparator model
In-the-head approaches, which emphasize computational processes in the brain that
produce and consume representations, such as facts about my intentions and the actions
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I perform, seem to dominate the current landscape of theorizing about the sense of
agency. A common model is based on the concept of efference copy, introduced in the
early 19th century (Steinbuch, 1811/2012). This concept refers to the idea that appro-
priately transformed copies of motor commands can be used to modulate afferent
signals, in order, for example, to cancel out sensory signals resulting from self-
generated movements (re-afference; see von Holst and Mittelstaedt 1950). An updated
version of this proposal (Fig. 1) postulates detailed internal models that predict the
proximal and distal sensory consequences of an action, and which can serve in
comparisons with either actual sensory feedback or the desired state of the agent (for
predictive in-the-head models of cognition in general also see Wolpert et al. 2003; Knill
and Pouget 2004; Grush 2004; or Seth 2014).
Frith et al. (2000a,b; see also Synofzik et al. 2008), for example, propose that a
match between predicted and desired state underlies a sense of being in control
(comparator C1 in Fig. 1). In anarchic hand, for instance, the patient’s movements are
triggered directly by environmental affordances, rather than what the patient holds to be
her intentions. Predictions made on the basis of involuntarily executed motor com-
mands would thus differ from the desired state as derived from the subject’s goals. The
resulting discrepancy could hence be experienced by the subject as a lack of control
over her own actions. Similarly, in patients with delusions of control, the predicted state
is supposed to be unavailable for monitoring. Again, a false discrepancy is thus
generated at the comparator, even though awareness of intention and action execution
is normal. The absence of an awareness of having initiated actions, so the authors
suggest, is tied to an absence of predicted action consequences prior to movement.
The comparison of predicted and actual (estimated) state, in contrast, allows for the
self-attribution of sensory events (comparator C2 in Fig. 1). In this scheme, if the actual
state matches one’s prediction, i.e. if events that have occurred can be Bexplained^
completely by what one has intended, then such events are attributed to one’s own
Fig. 1 The computational motor control hypothesis of action awareness. A person’s intentions or goals are
first translated into a desired state (bodily or world). Using an internal inverse model, motor commands are
computed that are appropriate for achieving this desired state (motor specification). The resulting bodily
movement leads to sensory feedback (proximal and distal), from which the actual state of the body and world
are estimated. The result of the comparison between predicted and desired state (C1) is supposed to underlie
the sense of control, while the comparison between actual and predicted state (C2) allows for self-attribution of
sensory events. Awareness of action-effects, i.e. the sense of achieving what was intended, involves the
comparison between one’s goals and the state of the world (C3). In patients with anarchic hand or utilization
behaviour, movements are triggered directly by environmental affordances, which override the subject’s
conscious intentions
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agency. The absence of any discrepancies at the comparator manifests itself in the
attentive recessiveness of the feeling of agency. By contrast, if actual sensory feedback
is incongruent with sensory predictions, external causation of the sensory stimuli can be
inferred (ex-afference). According to Frith et al. (2000a), in patients with anosognosia,
motor commands normally initiating actions do not lead to any movement (due to
paralysis), while predictions are still made based on their motor intention. The disorder,
in this case, results not from the corresponding discrepancy between predicted and
actual state, but from the patients’ inability to register this discrepancy.
According to the comparator hypothesis, the pre-reflective feeling of agency is thus
a diffuse sense that results from the matching flow of predictions and sensory feedback,
which occurs at the subpersonal level and is phenomenologically recessive, in the sense
that one normally becomes aware only of disruptions of the process, i.e. when one’s
anticipations are not met (Synofzik et al. 2007).
Despite its appeal, in proposing a simple computational mechanism underlying
sensorimotor self- awareness, which moreover seems to fit naturally into the growing
ecology of predictive brain theories (Friston 2010; Clark 2013; Seth 2014), the
comparator model is likely neither sufficient nor necessary to explain the feeling and
judgement of agency. Synofzik et al. (2007) present a range of arguments to this effect.
Firstly, subjects can attribute the same comparator mismatch in some cases to them-
selves and in others to the world. In other words, any potential mismatch itself has to be
registered and appropriately categorized by another process different from the compar-
ator. Also, in order to learn the required internal models, i.e. to learn the effect of its
own movements, the system already has to somehow know which of its movements are
caused by itself and which are not. Based on cases of pathological loss of action
awareness, as well as neuroanatomical lesions in areas supposed to be involved in the
comparator, the authors reach the conclusion that a much less specific congruence
between efferent and afferent signals in general (e.g. between an action intention and a
distal sensory effect, see comparator C3 in Fig. 1), alone or in combination with certain
intermodal congruencies, suffices to explain the feeling of agency. This idea is sup-
ported, for example, by patients who feel agency for phantom limbs (Ramachandran
and Rogers-Ramachandran 1996), i.e. in the absence of proprioceptive feedback as well
as efference copy. Similarly, in the Bhelping hands^ pantomime task, passive subjects
experience high degrees of agency for movements that are in fact performed by another
agent, when only the other agent’s hands appears in the place where the subject’s hands
would normally appear (Wegner and Sparrow 2004), i.e. when there is most plausibly
no efference copy and no comparator involved.
Synofzik et al. conclude that it is not a specific, unique and accurate prediction that
underlies different forms of action awareness. Rather, all kinds of action-related
perceptual and motor information, like efference copies, sensory feedback modalities
and their congruence, are combined in a multifactorial weighting process at different
levels of cognitive processing, where the importance of the different authorship cues
may vary with task, context, and person.
Apart from the question of whether comparators are necessary or sufficient for
different aspects of action awareness, another problem the approach faces concerns
the transition from subpersonal computations to an account of personal-level agency
experiences. Note that it cannot be simply the presence of certain computations and
resulting measures of mismatch, which constitutes the subjective sense of agency. If
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this was the case, then one would have to grant agency awareness also to thermostats
and simple robotic devices. Computations such as those involved in the comparator
model may hence play at most an enabling role in the sense of agency. As Synofzik
et al. (2007) have pointed out, whether the results of such computations contribute to
the experience of agency or not, must be decided by processes different from the
comparator itself. The sense of agency, on this view, is thus not in fact an Bintrinsic
property of the action processing itself^ (ibid. p. 4; also see Christoff et al. 2011, for a
similar claim).
The comparator model on its own does not offer an answer as to the experiential
nature of agency awareness. To do that, it needs to go a step further, and explain how it
is that we have these first-person, subjective experiences at all, accompanying (and
conditioned by) the proposed subpersonal computations. Although this aspect is less
well developed, the proposal is that the result of the comparator enters into the creation
of internal representations of Bmineness^ that become available to other cognitive
subsystems (Synofzik et al. 2008). In the case of the non-reflective feeling of agency,
these representations are supposed to be non-conceptual, yet abstracted from ongoing
action instances. They classify actions as caused by the self or not, but without explicit
attribution. They are not compositional (they are not composed of parts representing the
self and the fact of it being the cause of action), and have no object-property structure.
The reflective judgement of agency, in turn, is supposed to arise from further process-
ing of these primary representations, now involving conceptual capacities and beliefs,
which results in an explicit, propositional and compositional kind of representation of
actions as one’s own (ibid, pp. 415).
Even if a meaningful interpretation could be given to the idea of non-conceptual
representations, it is clear that whether one believes the comparator approach to be
fruitful hinges on one’s acceptance or not of experiences as fundamentally representa-
tional in nature (Metzinger 2000; Dretske 2003). In light of the pragmatic turn in
cognitive science (Varela et al. 1991; O’Regan and Noë 2001; Noë 2004; Engel et al.
2013), such doubts may at least warrant the exploration of less representation-centric
alternatives. We do not claim, of course, that all non-representational approaches to
action are necessarily compatible with the phenomenology of prereflective agency
described in section 2. But we believe the following account not only matches this
phenomenology well but may also shed some light on its origin.
4 Enactive sensorimotor theory
As we have argued above, cognitivist models aim at a view of action awareness in
which the experience of agency arises as an intrinsic aspect of action itself (at least in
the case of the pre-reflective feeling of agency). It is arguable whether this attempt
could be successful, given that it relies on the explicit construction of internal repre-
sentations from brain-side computations that may or may not be required for the sense
of agency. We propose here an alternative that synthesizes three different theoretical
developments, each of which views the cognitive agent essentially as an integrated
ecology of sensorimotor skills. The starting point is a dynamic interpretation of the
sensorimotor approach, which points the way towards a world-involving and non-
representational account of experience. This is enriched by the enactive notion of
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minimal agency, which we argue is required to explain how subjectivity can arise at the
sensorimotor level. Lastly, a dynamical reinterpretation of Piaget’s theory of equilibra-
tion will allow us to account for the different aspects of the sense of agency.
4.1 Dynamical, non-representational account of SMCs
We agree with the premise that the co-occurrence of actions and their typical sensory
consequences (i.e. sensorimotor contingencies), as well as a sensitivity to non-typical
consequences, are necessary preconditions for the sense of agency, as they may enable
a momentary and implicit distinction between self and environment. However, this idea
can be developed in a non-dualistic and non-representational manner, in which agency
experience is truly intrinsic to the performance of actions themselves as they form part
of self-asserting sensorimotor structures and relations, rather than derived through
verifications and inferences using pre-given criteria as to what does and does not
belong to the self.
According to the sensorimotor approach (O’Regan and Noë 2001; Noë 2004),
perceptual experience, such as seeing an object, does not derive from internal repre-
sentations in the brain, but is constituted by the skilful use of the regularities governing
active exploration of the world. More specifically, perceiving consists in the exercise of
practical mastery of the laws of sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs), i.e. of the lawful
regularities in the sensorimotor flow that govern intentional interaction with the
environment. Both the Bcontent^ and form of experience, i.e. what is perceived and
how, is constituted by the embodied know-how of the relevant SMCs put into practice.
The experiences associated with the various sensory modalities, or with distinct aspects
of the environment (e.g. colours or sounds) differ, because there are different sensori-
motor regularities involved in, say, seeing and hearing.
Our proposal is to extend the sensorimotor approach to the experience of oneself as
an agent. On this account, the sense of agency is not something derived from internal
representations of our own action-related processes. Rather, it is essentially another
dimension of our relation with the world, and derives from the ways in which we
establish, lose, and re-establish meaningful interactions between ourselves and our
environment. In the same way that certain regularities in the sensorimotor flow
associated with the enactment of SMCs determine the qualitative character of percep-
tual experience, certain features of the processes underlying the mastery and deploy-
ment of SMCs determine the character of agency experience.
We should note that when we talk about SMCs here, we refer to a specific dynamical
interpretation of the concept (Buhrmann et al. 2013). This interpretation allows for the
distinction between different kinds of SMCs, two of which are of particular relevance in
the current context: sensorimotor coordinations and strategies. Sensorimotor coordina-
tions describe particular sensorimotor patterns that are reliably used in performing a
task. These can be cycles or transients in sensorimotor space and depend on an agent’s
environment, body, inner activity, and the task-related context. Sensorimotor strategies
or schemes are organizations of several sensorimotor coordinations that the agent
deploys to achieve a given task and which are subject to some normative framework
(for instance, considerations of efficiency).
Crucial for the development of our proposal is that individual SM structures do not
exist in isolation. Rather, they are integrated in a complex network of interdependence.
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For example, my going to work may require that I first pick up my keys in the kitchen,
lock the door, enter the car, drive to the office, and so on. At the same time, the
sensorimotor scheme of picking up my keys is required in other contexts, such as going
to buy milk from the corner shop. Everyday skilful coping thus relies on the deploy-
ment of a network of interlocking sensorimotor schemes.
What do we mean by deployment of SMCs? How exactly does a subject engage a
particular SM scheme in his repertoire? For example, sitting at my desk, what deter-
mines whether I reach for the mouse to open my inbox in response to an incoming
email, or rather for the glass of water to quench my thirst? Here we outline a plausible
answer. Though constitutively involving the environment to close the sensorimotor
loop, the use of SMCs is supported on the brain side by metastable neurodynamic
structures in conjunction with metastable states in other non-neural systems in the body
(see e.g., Tognoli and Kelso 2014). Like, for example, dynamic fields (Erlhagen and
Schöner 2002; Schöner and Dineva 2007) such neurodynamical patterns may be
characterised by a continuous distribution of activation. One may imagine the neural
assemblies supporting different schemes as exhibiting localized peaks in this distribu-
tion, for instance (say, one for mouse control and one for grabbing the glass). If the
activation of any such peak is large enough, the corresponding scheme is engaged, i.e.
the neuro-dynamics engages the motor system. If the environmental conditions are
supportive, and the motor system is in a compatible state (e.g., not prevented from
moving), then the corresponding scheme is enacted by the agent.
Different sources of activation may prime individual SM schemes by raising their
excitability, such as internal signals related to volition and readiness (or my thirst), as
well as environmental affordances (the presence of the glass or computer mouse).
The activation-threshold model is just one possible way of conceptualising this
relation between different metastable neural and bodily states, rich in potentialities,
which according to the circumstances can get differentially actualised in the initia-
tion of a particular action. Other models also fit this account in terms of critical states
(see e.g., Kostrubiec et al. 2012; Wallot and Van Orden 2012). In a general sense, the
enactment of a particular SM scheme depends in normal circumstances on a reso-
nance between external and internal conditions related to the agent’s desires and
needs. Bodily states, history, dispositions and external factors may resonate with the
water-drinking scheme more intensely or sooner than with the email-reading
scheme, and it is this resonance between agent and world that breaks a symmetry
in the critical state and tips the balance. As the agent is involved in regulating its
coupling with the environment, an activity that in turn affects its own states, it is
conceivable that some agents may be able to influence the process of selection of SM
schemes, as a form of higher order regulation. This may take place through envi-
ronmental mediation (e.g., the arrangement of a work-environment to encourage
Bgood habits^). But it may also involve internal Bgestures^ that differentially
amplify specific neurodynamic patterns. This is clearly the case in agents possessing
linguistic abilities and capable of using them for their own self-control (Cuffari et al.
2015). On lower levels this may include the kind of volitional, readiness or appeti-
tive signals mentioned above. In both these cases–via alterations in the world, or via
internal gestures–the whole agent is involved in the process by encouraging certain
SM schemes to resonate with the situation while others are avoided or suppressed
(see also Fuchs 2011).
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4.2 Sensorimotor agency
The idea as sketched so far is not yet sufficient to address the weaknesses we have
identified in the comparator model. This is because the SM approach explains the origin of
differences between sensory modalities or instances of perceptual experiences, but as
Thompson (2005) has noted, it does not address the question of why we have experiences
at all, i.e., the problem of creature consciousness. In the same way that a self-guiding
missile, despite claims to the contrary (O’Regan and Noë 2001), does not have genuine
mastery of airplane-tracking, and hence no genuine perceptual experience of Bseeing^
airplanes, the sensorimotor account alone is insufficient to describe the kinds of systems
that can experience themselves as agents. What is missing, we argue, is an explicit notion
of sensorimotor agency, i.e. a naturalized concept of a sensorimotor-based subject,with an
intrinsically defined perspective, able to engage in intentional actions subserving her
desires and norms. It is necessary but not enough to claim, as Hutto and Myin (2013)
do, that Bthe phenomenological character of experiences must, ultimately, be understood
by appealing to interactions between experiencers and aspects of their environment^ (p.
176–77). Even if it was true that by defining phenomenological experience, such as of
oneself as an agent, exactly as a relation between the acting subject and its environment,
one may thus avoid having to explain the otherwise mysterious transition from mere
physical happenings to an agent capable of experiential phenomena, this would only
reframe the problem as the question of what an Bexperiencer^ is in the first place, i.e. what
is it about such entities that they can have experiences. We suggest that an enactive
framing of the sensorimotor approach can resolve this issue.
We propose that the origin of a first-person perspective, a prerequisite for talking of a
system enjoying experiences, is the emergence of sensorimotor agency. By this we
mean an entity whose constitution implies a unique and intrinsic perspective on the
world; or rather, an entity that, through its self-constitution, brings forth its own domain
of relevant interactions, or Umwelt in von Uexküll’s (1934) terms. This is most easily
understood in analogy to biological agency. From an enactive perspective, the simplest
living organisms already exhibit a form of agency. Unicellular organisms, for example,
are complex networks of precarious, co-dependent chemical reactions, in which the
activity of the whole network is necessary to prevent the component processes from
running down. These cells are agents in the sense that they can regulate interactions
with their environment in a way that support their continued existence (e.g. by
regulating osmotic pressure). Otherwise neutral external affairs thus gain a valenced
status with respect to the cell. What is good or bad for it is not arbitrarily defined by an
external observer, but is intrinsically determined by its processes of self-constitution.
Thus, unicellular organisms can be said to enjoy a certain subjectivity or perspective in
the sense of Bsentience, the feeling of being alive and exercising effort in movement^
(Thompson 2007, p. 161, see also Jonas 1966; Sheets-Johnstone 1999; Margulis 2001).
Barandiaran et al. (2009) have synthesized this idea into an operational definition of
minimal agency that is captured in three individually necessary and jointly sufficient
conditions. The first is individuality, the requirement that through its own activity the
system distinguishes itself from its surroundings in a non-arbitrary fashion. Organiza-
tional closure, a relation between component processes in which each precarious
process in the system is enabled by and in turn enables at least one other process, is
one way a system may realize its ongoing individuation.
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The second requirement for agency is interactional asymmetry: the system’s ability
not merely to passively suffer exchanges, but to actively modulate its interaction with
the environment. This is what we normally mean when we talk about agents
performing a move, rather than simply moving or being moved. Instead of being an
equal partner in the mutual coupling with its environment, the system is, at least in
some cases, the true source of activity, i.e. in some way responsible for, or the agent of,
this activity. Note this does not imply that interactional asymmetry has to be exercised
all the time. Some actions might involve active regulation only initially or intermit-
tently. And at times an agent may passively undergo changes that are not actions
proper. But also note that in many cases of apparent passivity or automaticity, for
instance, when I’m standing still without paying attention to my doing so, or in
Dreyfus’s examples of driving to work, shuffling to a comfortable distance in the lift,
or expert athletic performance, there may still be subpersonal processes of active
regulation occurring, such as those involved in balancing to ensure that I won't just
fall over, preparing one’s body for a rapid return in a tennis match, and so on.
Lastly, when interactions are modulated according to an agent’s goals and needs, and
thus have a normative dimension – they are actions, as commonly understood. Within
the framework of minimal agency, such normativity arises from the self-producing and
self-maintaining nature of the precarious system in question. Through its ongoing
individuation, the system intrinsically determines what interactions are supportive of
its continued existence, and what interactions threaten its survival. In other words, what
is good or bad for a minimal agent, is given by its own organization. When the system is
sensitive to these norms, and actively modulates it interactions with respect to them, then
we speak of the system adaptively regulating its structural coupling with the environ-
ment (Di Paolo 2005). Only such regulations, in contrast to other passive happenings,
are acts in the strict sense. They originate in the agent, and they can succeed or fail.
Intrinsic normativity of this kind is the third requirement for minimal agency.
In summary, a minimal agent is Ban autonomous organization capable of adaptively
regulating its coupling with the environment according to the norms established by its
own viability conditions^ (ibid, p. 376). We argue that the nature of agents as self-
asserting systems, able to evaluate external affairs in terms of their own viability, is the
origin also of a minimal subjectivity.1
However, when we talk about human-level agency, much of our everyday behav-
iour, while taking place within the constraint of biological viability, is underdetermined
by it. Many of our actions, for example, acquire intrinsic value Bon top^ of their organic
functionality: movements can be dexterous, postures awkward, a walk elegant, and so
on. The question is whether a new form of autonomy and agency may arise at the
behavioural level, not fully determined by biological constraints. Following Di Paolo
(2005) and Barandiaran (2007), we suggest that the answer is positive, and that the
behavioural analogue to biological agency is a network of precarious but interactively
self-sustaining sensorimotor schemes, i.e. a self-asserting sensorimotor repertoire,
whose adaptive regulation is directed at the preservation of internal coherence and
consistency. Could such a system satisfy the three criteria for minimal agency?
1 For further discussion on the enactive notion of autonomy and its relation to sense-making and agency see
e.g. Weber and Varela 2002; Di Paolo 2005; Thompson 2007; Di Paolo and Thompson 2014; also Thompson
2011, and critical commentary in the same issue).
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Firstly, non-trivial self-assertion of individuality requires that without the system’s
activity its component processes will cease to exist, in other words that they are precarious.
How does this apply to sensorimotor organizations? Firstly, many of our behaviours are
habitual in nature. By this we do not mean that they are automatic and stereotypical, but
that they (and/or the neurodynamic structures underlying them) are reinforced through
their repeated exercise, which they also tend to pre-dispose, and without which they are in
danger of being extinguished (Barandiaran and Di Paolo 2014; Carlisle 2014). As is well-
known, skills and habits tend to decay in the absence of frequent enough enactments,
hence their precariousness (see Arthur et al. 2013). A self-reinforcing tendency predis-
posing future enactments can counteract this decay. But excessive robustness also plays
against the precariousness requirement. Instead, as part of a greater network, schemes and
habits may also depend on other behaviours as preconditions for their exercise. It is
precisely this form of co-dependence that furnishes habits or schemes with a certain plastic
opening towards novelty. A habit wears grooves and sets limits to itself. But, according to
Dewey (1925), this is true of an isolated habit. Interaction between habits Bnot only
increases the number and variety of habits, but tends to link them subtly together, and
eventually to subject habit-forming in a particular case to the habit of recognizing that new
modes of association will exact a new use of it. Thus habit is formed in view of possible
future changes and does not harden so readily ,^ (ibid., p. 281). In this way, the sensori-
motor agent is individuated as a complex network of interdependent SM schemes, each
helping to sustain the others by avoiding both decay and over-rigidity.
Normativity in a network of sensorimotor structures, we propose, arises from the fact
that such a network can be coherent and stable to varying degrees. By this we mean that
individual sensorimotor structures may be more or less well adapted to the context in
which they are usually enacted and that the SM repertoire may hold SM schemes that are,
up to a point, mutually conflicting. It is easy to see how in early developmental stages
infants may enact the wrong sensorimotor coordinations (see e.g. the dynamical systems
analysis of preservative reaching, the A-not-B error, in infants by Smith and Thelen 2003),
or possess conflicting sensorimotor schemes (Piaget 1981, relates the story of children’s
confusion when first trying to recognise letters that look identical in the mirror and those
that do not). Similar perturbations of the repertoire’s coherence are to be expected as the
agent matures and acquires new skills (and forgets others) throughout her lifetime.
Finally, when the agent constituted by the sensorimotor network becomes sensitive to
these norms of coherence and stability, and adaptively guides transformations that con-
serve its Bviability^ (interactional asymmetry), we may speak of a system that exhibits
agency at the sensorimotor level. Because such systems have an intrinsic concern for their
own stability, and evaluate environmental conditions in terms of what is good or bad for
themselves, they entail a subjective perspective (Jonas 1966; Thompson 2007), and
therefore allow us to speak of them as possessing interiority and enjoying experiences.2
2 Sensorimotor identity comprises its own processes of individuation which are different from those that
sustain the organic identity of biological agency. The latter constrains sensorimotor agency without fully
determining it. We do not discuss here the complex question of how these two forms of agency and identity
relate to each other. While conceptually it is important to highlight the distinction between the two kinds of
agency, in practice their relation includes the possibility of mutual influence and co-development, leading
potentially to integrated personal agency (see also discussion on the social agency in the last section). Habits
can shape organic identity, for instance in terms of diet, daily activities, hygiene, exposure to chemicals,
pathogens, and so on.
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We should clarify at this point that the experiences we propose a sensorimotor agent
is able to enjoy differ from the minimal sentience that (mere) organic agency entails. In
particular, we claim that sensorimotor agents may experience their actions as their own,
and that we can derive the qualities and aspects of how such systems experience their
own agency from the way in which they exercise adaptive regulations to maintain a
stable sensorimotor repertoire. Piaget has developed exactly such an account of how
sensorimotor skills are developed and coherently maintained via adaptive transforma-
tions. To this we turn next.
4.3 SM equilibration
Piaget’s research in the areas of cognitive development and genetic epistemology can
be seen as an attempt to determine how higher forms of human understanding (e.g.
abstract and rational) arise from earlier and more implicit forms of sensorimotor
organization. A fundamental building block in his theory is the concept of a scheme.
By this he refers to a kind of behavioural pattern, or action, always required for making
(practical) sense of our environment, which matches directly with the level of SMCs we
have identified above as BSM schemes^. According to Piaget, and in agreement with
the sensorimotor approach, the environment is not a set of pre-existing stimulus
conditions that impact on the organism to produce a perceptual or cognitive effect. A
subject can rather perceive—in the sense of understanding for what it is, or what it is
for—only those environmental aspects or events that she can actively assimilate
(integrate or absorb) into already existing sensorimotor schemes. The maturing subject,
moreover, faced with an ever changing world (and body), will constantly be challenged
by not-yet-assimilated aspects of her environment, which create internal sources of
tension and conflict in her cognitive organization. Through adaptive processes of
accommodation, Piaget proposes, the existing repertoire of sensorimotor schemes is
modulated or transformed over time such as to address new behavioural challenges.
The subject is thus continuously poised at the edge between assimilation and accom-
modation, in a process of equilibration through which she reaches new forms of
organizational (meta)stability.
Piaget illustrates the stabilization of a SM scheme as the closure of a cycle of more
basic sensorimotor coordinations (which again match with the corresponding level of
SMCs defined above). So, for instance, a baby’s scheme for drinking milk from a bottle
(and thus her perception of the bottle as affording such action) may involve the more
basic coordinations of latching on, suckling, swallowing, breathing etc., organized
appropriately such as to achieve the desired result. Individual coordinations, in turn,
depend for their correct exercise on the assimilation of corresponding aspects of the
environment, such as the shape of the bottle, the sensation of milk flowing or air being
inhaled and so on. Such behavioural patterns can be perturbed in different ways. In
Piagetian terms, a subject may experience an obstacle when a previously successful
sensorimotor coordination fails to assimilate its corresponding environmental aspect
(e.g. failure to latch on to the bottle because the teat’s shape has changed). Alternatively,
the subject may encounter a lacuna, or gap in the current sensorimotor organization. In
this case, something is manifestly unknown about the world since the presumed correct
handling of the situation (e.g. latching on) does not lead Bas expected^ to the next stage
in the cycle (e.g. suckling, perhaps because the bottle is empty).
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The process of equilibration reduces the occurrence of such perturbations by
modifying or deriving new sensorimotor schemes from existing ones, involving pro-
cesses such as differentiation, grouping, branching, re-ordering, and so on (resulting,
for example, in the creation of a bottle-feeding scheme from a prior breast-feeding
scheme). Moreover, processes of equilibration also tend to maintain internal coherence
in the repertoire of SM schemes. Piaget suggests, for instance, that reciprocal processes
of accommodation and assimilation may also occur between schemes, as well as
between schemes and the system’s totality (involving a hierarchical dimension of
relationships among schemes). Note that the conservation of self-sustaining sensori-
motor schemes, and the stability of the SM repertoire as a whole, play the role of
adaptive regulations in the definition of minimal agency, and as such may already
ground aspects of normativity at the sensorimotor level. What is good or bad for the
subject as a sensorimotor agent is, respectively, what can be equilibrated or what
provokes tensions or instabilities in his cognitive organization. For an example of
how the stability of a SM scheme, rather than some external measure of performance,
can guide the learning of a new sensorimotor skill see Kostrubiec et al. (2012).
Piaget’s idea of equilibration can be made more explicit by casting it in terms of
processes involving SMCs (Di Paolo et al. 2014). Dynamically, there are two condi-
tions for the successful assimilation of an environmental feature or process into a
sensorimotor scheme. The stability condition specifies that the pattern or set of
environmental states and the pattern or set of the agent’s states, when engaged in a
sensorimotor coordination, are mutually stabilizing. In other words, the fully coupled
agent-environment system, when engaged in such a coordination, produces only
trajectories that belong to the same functional class (fulfilling the same role in the
task). The transition condition specifies that the production of a stable sensorimotor
coordination A leads in time to the production of coordination B, where B is the next
stage in the sensorimotor scheme comprising the individual coordinations. On this
account, Piaget’s lacunae correspond to violations of the transition condition, and
obstacles to violations of the stability condition. As we will argue next, these violations
may be experienced as breakdowns of agency, and their absence as the feeling of
control.
5 Enactive sense of agency
We are now in a position to synthesise the three theoretical strands – the dynamical
sensorimotor approach, the enactive notion of sensorimotor agency, and the dynamical
theory of sensorimotor equilibration – to offer an enactive account for the sense of
agency. According to our proposal, a basic experiencing agent is constituted by a self-
asserting network of mutually enabling precarious sensorimotor schemes; a network
whose stability is constantly challenged by environmental and internal requirements,
and which undergoes adaptive processes of equilibration to counter these challenges.
Such an organization satisfies the three requirements for minimal agency and may thus
be said to constitute an identity that emerges at the sensorimotor level, bearing its own
concerns, acting on its own behalf, entertaining its own perspective; in short, a
sensorimotor subject. What and how this agent experiences perceptually, according to
the sensorimotor approach, is determined by her sensorimotor repertoire. Crucially, we
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propose that how the agent experiences her engagements with the world, i.e., whether
as owned and self-driven or not, is determined by different modes of equilibration both
within and between SM schemes, and by how these modes of equilibration re-assert the
individuation of the sensorimotor subject.
To motivate this idea, consider the following parallel. The sense of agency is
generally understood by many as originating in a kind of self-monitoring, i.e. a diffuse
awareness of the effect of one’s actions on the environment and one’s body. This is
analogous to the requirement of adaptivity for minimal agency, i.e. an agent’s moni-
toring and adaptive regulation of the consequences of its activities for its own viability.
In the context of sensorimotor agency, we have developed Piaget’s theory of equili-
bration as a possible form of adaptivity (see Di Paolo et al. 2014). Our suggestion is that
the different aspects of the sense of agency discussed in Section 2 derive from the
modes in which a sensorimotor agent monitors and adaptively regulates its interactions
such as to stabilise and deploy a precarious network of SM schemes. This will involve
both the (meta)stability of SM schemes and the (meta)stability of their mutual relations,
i.e., aspects intrinsic to individual actions and aspects concerning how schemes relate to
each other.
To be more specific, our proposal states that the different aspects of the sense of
agency cohere with the different aspects of assimilation and accommodation in a
sensorimotor agent and not with specific relations between sensory signals. For
example, we consider the diffuse and attentively recessive feeling of agency to be
the experiential consequence of a network of SM schemes successfully assimilat-
ing the current environmental context. In other words, the absence of any pertur-
bations to my dynamic equilibrium, is the feeling that Beverything is going
according to (my) plan^. Since SM schemes are always enacted by the sensori-
motor agent owning them and their enactment in turn re-constitutes the organiza-
tion that constitutes the sensorimotor agent, the Bfirst-person givenness^ is already
implicit in the process that asserts a SM scheme within the precarious network,
i.e., its enactment. In other words, whether or not I am the agent of my actions, at
this level of equilibration, is not a question of verification based on comparisons
between signals, since it always is and can only be I who enacts a SM scheme
whose outcome is to contribute to re-affirm my own agency. The enactment of the
act asserts the agency of the agent.
The sensorimotor Bcongruence^ required for this pre-reflective feeling of agency is
not one involving precise matching of predicted feedback, as in the comparator model.
Rather, it is simply the satisfaction of the stability and transition conditions for
assimilation (as defined above), in other words, the fact that agent and environment
play the roles required for the enactment of the SM scheme to be successful and
coherent with the rest of the network. It is thus not a congruence between internal
signals in the brain, but an appropriateness of the chosen scheme given the current
situation in agent and environment. The agent does not need to Bfind out^ whether a
SM scheme equilibrates by comparing signals. It is the enactment of the SM scheme
itself that results in success or failure to various degrees (see discussion on intrinsic
normativity in SM schemes in Di Paolo, et al. 2014). An obstacle or a lacuna are
manifested directly in the failure to equilibrate within an SM scheme or between one
SM scheme and another. The manifestation is world-involving and also personal since
it implies the agent as a whole.
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While this sense of agency is phenomenologically recessive, we do become more
consciously aware of situations where our interactional stability is challenged and an
assimilation fails. Such situations correspond to the cases of lacunae and obstacles just
mentioned. In the former case, I am, in a sense, successfully engaged in what used to be
the correct SM coordination given the context (e.g. I perform the right arm movements
to dribble a basketball). But because of changes in the structure of the environment
(say, a loose floorboard), or changes in my own body, my enacting of the coordination
does not lead to action effects appropriate for achieving the desired outcome usually
associated with the full SM scheme; i.e. the transition to the next coordination in the
scheme’s own organization fails (the ball does not return to my hands, which prevents
me from catching it). I will experience this as a lack of agency for the outcomes of my
actions. Conversely, in the absence of lacunae, the satisfaction of the transition condi-
tion may contribute to the intentional aspect of achievement in my feeling of agency
(the feeling of successful dribbling). In the case of obstacles, in contrast, the environ-
ment or my body do not Bplay along^, as they usually do in my enactment of a SM
coordination (e.g. a deflated ball, or injured arm preventing me from correctly dribbling
the ball). What is experienced in this case, is the lack of a sense of control for my
action. The basic feeling of agency that derives from aspects of ongoing movement
(Table 1), namely the intentional aspect of achieving the desired (distal) effect and the
feeling of control (proximal), is thus best described as an absence in our account. It is
the feeling that my agency is not currently challenged by lacunae nor obstacles.
Another kind of agency awareness can be associated with features of the ongoing
process of active equilibration of SM schemes. Though failure of assimilation may in
the first instance raise awareness that I am not in total control of my interactions and
their consequences, a second level of awareness may arise from the effort I have to
exert in order to re-equilibrate, i.e. to counter perturbations and re-establish a Bsmooth^
interaction. In other words, this sense of agency corresponds to the amount of self-
Table 1 Aspects in the pre-reflective sense of agency and the corresponding processed involved





Awareness of intention prior to
movement. Sense of urge.
Selection between metastable
SM schemes and the covert
effects of the anticipative state
on other parts of the
cognitive organization.
Movement specification:
Sense of having initiated one’s
movements (early efferent).
Engagement of SM scheme, and
covert effect of a stabilized
committed state on other parts





Sense of achieving the intended
effect (distal feedback about
outcome, action-effect).
Satisfaction of the transition condition.
Lacking or perturbed sense
of achievement in case of lacunae.
Control:
Sense of successfully controlling
the current action (afferent
-efferent congruence).
Satisfaction of the stability condition.
Lacking or perturbed sense of
control in case of obstacles.
Effort:
Sense of exerting control.
Adaptive processes of (re-)equilibration.
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correcting activity involved in achieving increased equilibration. As this activity
diminishes whenever equilibration approaches its maximum condition, the intensity
of the effort-related aspect of agency experience also diminishes. A prediction of this
view would be that if we were to perform a very repetitive task, such as a long copy and
paste sequence, our sense of effort should be greatest at the beginning, since we have to
deploy more regulatory resources to establish a stable interaction to begin with. But as
we repeat the actions, and as long as we do not suffer from fatigue, these would come to
feel more and more automatic. Once the fluent interaction is established, and not
challenged by unexpected events, the initially strong sense of effort is thus replaced
by a less intense feeling of being in control (and though the actions may feel
Bautomatic^, it never feels as if somebody else is in control).
In this respect, Nahmias (2005) and Pacherie (2007b) acknowledge a certain
ambiguity affecting the sense of agency in situations of effortless control. Pacherie
suggests introducing a distinction between the feeling of being in control and the
feeling of exerting control. The latter is what we may call the kind of agency awareness
we associate with progressive equilibration. As equilibration is achieved, the feeling of
exerting control becomes ambiguous. Our prediction of a loss of intensity in this feeling
during fluent, repetitive tasks (before we reach a situation of fatigue), we note, is quite
different from what would be expected from the comparator model, since we cannot
introduce the distinction of being in control and exerting control in it. The better the
match between predicted and sensed signals, the less the error and therefore the more
reaffirmed or confirmed the sense of agency should become, contrary to what we
suggest would happen according to our proposal.
Some aspects of agency experience associated with the initiation of movement are
identified in Table 1 as the awareness for one’s intention and the awareness for having
decided to engage (now) in action. We can relate these aspects to the dynamics of how a
particular SM scheme in one’s repertoire is selected and activated. As sketched above,
we envision this process as one of competition between SM structures, whose imple-
mentation on the agent-side involve metastable neurodynamic patterns and bodily
states, and which resonate with compatible environmental conditions. When the activ-
ity of such a SM structure is lifted above a certain level (e.g., through adaptive
regulations by the agent), the scheme is activated, coupled to the motor system, and
thereby allowed to contribute to overt action (unless movement is prevented). Crucially,
the emergence of a preferred scheme (the passage from metastable to more stable
neuro- and body dynamics), even if not yet activated at the muscular level, can
nevertheless have real consequences for the agent. This corresponds to the agent being
in an anticipative state, in which the selection of the scheme may influence other
processes in the agent’s cognitive organization. The agent’s sensitivity to the selected
scheme thus constitutes a kind of awareness of processes and events about to ensue,
and we identify this sensitivity as coherent with the intentional aspect of action
awareness (the awareness of having the intention to move). For example, when a tennis
player forms the intention to return his opponent’s serve, he is already prepared to move
in a certain way (e.g. by setting up required motor primitives and synergies). But at the
same he is still sensitive to the different ways the ball may be served, as well as to the
different options for his opponent’s reaction to his upcoming return. The particular
manifold of possibilities associated with the selection of a specific return scheme is
experienced by the player as his intention to enact that return.
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The irreversible activation of a scheme, in contrast, implies a commitment to move.
Now the agent is less sensitive to the possibilities and tendencies for action that may or
may not occur. Instead, his activity is funnelled towards the execution of a single active
SM scheme, which again may lead to changes in other parts of the cognitive organi-
zation, such as the priming of SM schemes that usually follow the current one. We
identify this narrowing down of dynamical possibilities (commitment 3), and the
corresponding real consequences for the agent as a whole, as the awareness for action
initiation. In our example, the tennis player’s engagement of the return action may
already have primed his subsequent move towards the net, for instance. The associated
collapsing of possible alternative courses of action is experienced by the player as his
having initiated the return.
One may also picture the temporal dynamics of the selection and activation of a
scheme as the emergence and shaping of a particular basin of attraction in the agent’s
SM space. The structure of the scheme’s basin determines the agent-environment
synergies, or constraints on their coupling, that are appropriate in the given task context.
This poises the agent in an anticipative state rich in equally valid propensities to respond
(this is the intentional aspect). A slight change in circumstances (internal or external)
then can be enough to break the system’s symmetry and select one amongst many
possible actions (the action initiation aspect). This is the same view Wallot and van
Orden (2012) defend for explaining cases of so-called ultrafast cognition, i.e., cognitive
performances with response times as fast or faster than the estimated physiological limits
of information processing. Empirical evidence in their support also counts in favour of
our interpretation of SM scheme dynamics. Our crucial addition is that the emergence of
a SM scheme’s basin of attraction, and the symmetry-breaking, also have covert
consequences on other parts of the cognitive organization, which results in the agent’s
awareness of intention and action initiation respectively.
In general then, the distinction between the sense of being the initiator of an
action (associated with intentions and premotor activity), and the sense of being in
control (on-going motor-sensory matching) can be neurophenomenologically
matched to processes of accommodation and assimilation respectively. Note, that
in terms of equilibration, the initiation of a new SM scheme is already an adaptive
regulation, i.e. a response to a new external or internal challenge to stability. The
feeling of being the initiator of an action would thus not be limited only to cases
of prior losses of control over one’s actions.
3 The notion of commitment, seemingly vague, has been measured in simulation models of minimal cognition
and indirectly in neuroscientific studies. When a simulated agent must make a choice between alternative
behaviours, one can systematically study the effect of variations in the agent’s or environmental states on the
final choice made by the agent. One can explore this effect over time and find counter-intuitively that
commitment to a choice is not a monotonic quantity that increases progressively as the time for execution
approaches but that instead it can fluctuate in complex ways (Beer 2003). Alternatively, one can ‘freeze’ time
just before the simulated agent has made its choice and ask the question ‘what if things had been slightly
different?’ and then quantify the effect of changes to the environment on the decision— the larger the effect,
the less the commitment to the action that is nevertheless actualized (Iizuka and Di Paolo 2007; Di Paolo and
Iizuka 2008). In the case of humans the stability of neural cortical patterns may be measured indirectly in
single perceptual trials by analyzing the statistical variability corresponding to different cortical regions.
Evidence shows that low variability or other measures of coherence between recorded patterns indicating a
more stable global state correspond to the emergence of a commitment to a conscious perceptual choice
(Schurger et al. 2015; Varela et al. 2001).
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Different aspects in the sense of agency may further be mapped to the type of
assimilation condition being challenged or the different forms of equilibration
(summarised in Table 1). As we have said, intentional aspects of action awareness
may be related more with the occurrence of lacunae, and movement-related aspects
more with obstacles. Without being able to develop a full story here, one may also
relate the distinction by Marcel (2003) between short and long-term senses of agency to
the different kinds of equilibration. For instance, equilibration occurring to address
incongruence between a SM scheme and the environment here and now may underlie
the instantaneous feeling of agency. In contrast, adaptive processes aiming to resolve
mutual conflicts between SM schemes, or between a SM scheme and the repertoire as a
whole, may underlie the general feeling of being reliably effective in one’s actions, and
of possessing the necessary sensorimotor skills to deal with one’s everyday life. In this
sense, the higher forms of equilibration may be necessary for the experience of oneself
as a unified, persisting and coherent source of intentional activity over time.
As an example of the applicability of our proposal consider passivity experience in
schizophrenic patients with delusions of control. These patients do not disown the
intentional aspect of their actions. They successfully follow instructions by an exper-
imenter, and do not try to stop the affected movements. They report, however, not to
have been responsible for initiating their actions, i.e. not to have consciously intervened
in their execution (passivity). In other words, they have correct awareness of their
intentions, but not of action initiation.
According to the comparator hypothesis, this aspect of agency experience results
primarily from efferent signals, i.e., from the flow of motor specifications that are
responsible for translating intentions into movement and occur prior to their execution.
On one account (Frith et al. 2000a), it is suggested that the passivity experience arises
from an impaired predictor of limb position. While the patient is aware of his intentions,
and while these are translated into the correct movements and achieve the desired
effect, in the absence of predictions at the comparator (both C1 and C2 in Fig. 1), the
patient is not aware of the precise specification for movement, and as a result, it is
presumed, of his initiating it. The situation at the comparator is as if the movement was
passive, and the afferent feedback is thus attributed to external causes rather than to the
self.
From our enactive perspective there is no need for central predictors to account for
the awareness of action initiation.4 As we have argued, awareness of intention and
action initiation results from the real but covert effects that the selection and activation
of SM schemes have on the rest of the agent’s cognitive organization. In particular, the
activation of a specific SM scheme places the agent in a state of Bcommitment^ that
may constrain future actions by differentially modulating other SM schemes that
usually follow. Awareness of action initiation may be disrupted, resulting in passivity
experience, when a SM scheme’s activation no longer has the right secondary effects on
the remaining SM repertoire, i.e. when the scheme is executed as if decoupled from the
greater network. This view is compatible, for example, with speculations by Frith et al.
(2000a) regarding the underlying neurological abnormalities in patients with delusions
4 That is not to say that sensorimotor behaviours or schemes cannot be anticipative in nature, but rather that
each scheme, if required, may be intrinsically anticipative rather than relying necessarily on detailed internal
models (see Stepp and Turvey 2010).
The enactive sense of agency
of control. The authors argue that the overactivity in the inferior parietal cortex, as
observed in some patients, may be due to abnormal modulation via the anterior
cingulate, which in turn is speculated to be involved in attention to future actions and
suppression of inappropriate actions.
In short, abnormal awareness of action initiation may be due to impaired coupling
between different SM schemes, which in normal circumstances results in anticipative
modulation of future actions. Such an impairment would not interfere with the actual
execution of a SM scheme, which is compatible with the fact that schizophrenic
patients have no problem with motor control itself. A prediction may be, however, that
rapid execution of (unusual, non-automatic) action sequences could be impaired, since
the selection of one scheme does not always correctly prime other relevant ones ahead
of time. Though we are not aware of any experiments testing this specifically, there is
evidence that schizophrenic patients, though not having problems with anticipative
motor control per se, show indeed a deficit in the sequencing of motor actions
(Delevoye-Turrell et al. 2003).
6 Discussion
Our hypothesis fulfils several requirements that we believe should apply to any
enactive account of the sense of agency. Firstly, the experience of agency, like any
other experience in the enactive approach, is relational in nature, i.e. fundamentally
world-involving, rather than internal to the brain. It is constituted by structures or
processes present in our active exploration of the world, by properties or modes of the
relation between agent and environment.
Secondly, the prereflective sense of agency, in our account, is an intransitive
experience. It is not an experience of ‘me’ as an object of perception (as defended
e.g. by Bayne 2011) or introspection, but rather the basic feeling of my intentional
directedness at the world; i.e. the feeling of (re-)asserting myself as an agent in
meaningful interactions with the world. Thus, our proposal does not reduce the sense
of agency to an epistemic issue (accessing information to verify authorship) but also
accounts for the ontological question of how a SM scheme participates in the ongoing
constitution of the agent; the epistemic issue comes out in the wash.
Thirdly, evidence provided for the comparator model suggests that some form of
congruence between different motor and sensory streams is, or can be, involved in the
feeling of agency. Our hypothesis accounts for this congruence (satisfaction of assim-
ilation conditions), and its breakdown (lacunae and obstacles), in a more general way
than matching signals and without requiring precise predictions or internal
representations.
Fourthly, our proposal accounts for the fact that the sense of agency phenomeno-
logically presents itself as a heterogeneous collection of different ways or aspects of
feeling in control that depends on context, the task, the person’s history and capacities,
and so on. Since individual SM schemes are by definition task-specific, and therefore
vary for example in terms of the sensory modalities involved, the balance of contribu-
tions from agent-internal and environmental processes etc., it follows that the sense of
agency should vary from situation to situation and, when it breaks down, it does so in
accordance with the specific demands and properties of the task and person.
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Fifthly, our proposal coheres naturally with the phenomenological recessiveness of
the feeling of agency as the absence of perturbations or instabilities in an agent’s active
assimilation of its environment. Conversely, the fact that we often become aware only
of our loss of agency, when our intentions are thwarted or our sensorimotor engage-
ments unexpectedly disrupted, is explained by the occurrence of violations of the
assimilation conditions.
Lastly, by satisfying the three requirements for minimal agency, our proposal solves
the problem of who is experiencing by positing that there exists a well-defined subject
that is experiencing its own agency, namely a sensorimotor agent constituted by a self-
sustaining network of precarious sensorimotor schemes. Such an agent is invested in
interactions with its own intrinsic norms, and its very constitution brings forth a domain
of self-relevant interactions, and therewith an intrinsic subjectivity and perspective on
the world (Di Paolo 2005; Jonas 1966; Thompson 2007). In this sense, our account
spans both the subpersonal level of sensorimotor processes, as well as the personal level
of the experiencing subject, something the comparator model fails to do satisfactorily.
An additional aspect that distinguishes our proposal from most accounts of the sense
of agency (e.g. Marcel 2003; Synofzik et al. 2008; Pacherie 2007b), is that it conceives
of actions and intentions as inseparable qualitative aspects of sense-making (in the sense
of Merleau-Ponty’s motor intentionality, 2012/1945; also see Gallagher and Miyahara
2012). In our view, all actions are by definition intentional; equally there is no such thing
as an abstract intentional ‘state’ as divorced from the action that it requires for its
realization, even if for whatever reason such action is not fully actualised. The inten-
tional aspect of an action derives from the dispositions that the agent exhibits when a SM
scheme is selected from the greater repertoire; and from the fact that the selection itself
involves the agent’s needs and desires. For a variety of reasons, however, an action may
not be (fully) realized. In this case the intentional aspect may manifest itself without any
overt movement (Di Paolo 2015). This manifestation may nevertheless have real
consequences for the agent, and as such may underlie the experience of agency (as well
as perceptual experience), in situations that do not seem to involve movement or the
world, such as illusions, hallucinations, or in case of paralysis or locked-in syndrome
(Kyselo and Di Paolo, 2014, see also Beaton 2013).
Our proposal has assumed a certain phenomenology of agency experience as
unquestionable, in particular the distinction between a prereflective feeling and a
conceptual judgement of agency. However, this phenomenological account is by no
means universally accepted. Indeed, it is not uncommon to question whether there is
any distinctive feeling of agency at all, or at least its status as a distinct kind of
experience. We cannot here respond in detail to all existing opinions about the
epistemological and ontological status of agency experiences. We limit ourselves to
highlight a few alternatives and their relation to our proposal.
On one line of thought, for example, the sense of agency is presumed to derive from
retrospective conceptual inference about one’s intentions and observed events (Ste-
phens and Graham 2000; Wegner and Wheatley 1999; Alsmith 2015). For proponents
of this doxasticmodel the Bsense^ of agency is not a type of experience at all, but rather
a species of belief. We agree with Bayne (2011) in that everyday intuition, the results of
experimental manipulation, and observations from pathological cases provide sufficient
evidence for the separability between the experience of agency and conscious judge-
ments or cognitive inferences about it.
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Equally extreme is Dreyfus’s account of skillful absorbed coping (2007), in which
he claims that in such situations not only is there a loss of conscious awareness of – and
reflection on – what one is doing, but also a complete loss of any non-reflective
experience whatsoever: BIn general, when one is totally absorbed in one’s activity,
one ceases to be a subject^ (ibid., p. 373). All there is, on this account, are automatic
happenings in response to dispositional sensitivities that have been tuned in the process
of mastery of the relevant skill. BIn fully absorbed coping, there is no immersed ego,
not even an implicit one. The coper […] only needs to be capable of entering a
monitoring stance if the brain […] sends an alarm signal that something is going
wrong^ (ibid, p. 374). We agree with Zahavi (2013) here, in that Dreyfus seems to be
going too far in rejecting the role of subjective awareness in absorbed coping by
implying that there can only be conscious monitoring or no subjectivity at all, while
not considering the possibility of an implicit first-personal givenness in experience (as
well as subpersonal monitoring and regulation, which we believe would still be
occurring in the highly skilled, if absorbed, activity he refers to). As Zahavi notes, at
least in this point Dreyfus seems to be at odds with the phenomenological tradition with
which he associates himself. This first-personal givenness, in our view, partly manifests
itself in the phenomenological recessiveness of the sense of agency during skilful
coping. This, as we have said, may best be described as a feeling of absence (of friction
or challenges impeding my coping). Importantly, a feeling of absence is not the same as
the absence of a feeling.
Defenders of the thetic model, in contrast, while not denying the experience of
agency as such, claim that the sense of agency is but another form of perception,
namely a transitive experience of certain things being the case about one’s intentional
actions; in other words, involving representations of certain facts about my actions that
are available to my awareness. Such states are understood to have a mind to world
direction, in so far as they are verified as true when they fit the world, and otherwise
non-veridical (also see Bayne 2011, for a more detailed discussion of this school of
thought; as well as De Vignemont 2013, and Bermúdez 2015, for a related discussion in
the context of sense of ownership). The comparator model squarely falls into this
category, which we reject for reasons already given in sections 3 and 4.2.
Another example of the thetic approach is Grünbaum’s (2015) argument that what
subjects report (or experimenters interpret) as a feeling of agency, may ultimately be
reducible to the awareness for one’s conscious intentions (possibly based on premotor
processes involving intentions, planning and action-selection), and therefore not a
distinct kind of agency experience after all. In this respect we note that by considering
only the case of an Bintention-free^ feeling of agency (ibid., p. 21), the author implicitly
rules out the possibility that the experience of agency may be distinct in virtue not of its
irreducibility to conscious intentions, but of its being implicit in the first-personal
givenness or egocentricity of (motor-)intentional actions; which we have here spelled
out as the reaffirmation of a sensorimotor system’s agency in intentional action.
Elsewhere the author argues that we have the Bexperience of acting intentionally^
when non-propositional practical sensorimotor anticipations are fulfilled sensorily
(Grünbaum 2011). This seems to match closely our account of successfully assimilating
sensorimotor coordinations, and in our view this is one aspect of the kind of intransitive
agency experience the author aims to deny. The difference seems to be i) that these
anticipations, according to Grünbaum, are derived subpersonally from basic
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propositional intentions, and ii) that it is the role of the agentive experience to justify the
agent’s belief about his actions (Bwhich is formed by grasping the content of one’s basic
intention as a description of one’s action^). We believe that our enactive proposal
shows how in everyday skillful behavior, the sense of agency does not (only) play this
epistemological role, but is rather an intrinsic aspect of how meaningful sensorimotor
schemes are organised and enacted in the world. Propositional beliefs need not be
involved at all according to our proposal.
The view we defend in this paper is best described as a telic model: the sense of
agency is understood as an intransitive experience that is implicit in intentional action
itself, i.e. such actions are considered to be enjoying experiential character, or phenom-
enal properties themselves (see, e.g., Searle 1983). Telic states have a world to mind
direction of fit. Their aim is to bring about certain changes in the world. They are
satisfied when an intentional action is successfully realized (assimilation), or otherwise
fail and remain unsatisfied or frustrated (requiring accommodation). According to our
proposal, the prereflective feeling of agency is of this kind. It is tightly linked with the
reaffirmation of an agent as an agentive system through its actions. As such, I cannot
have a feeling of agency for a movement if I am not the agent of it, i.e. this feeling
cannot be non-veridical (though my reflective judgement could). Regarding support for
such a non-observational approach to action awareness also see Marcel (2003).
Since ours is a meso-level proposal, we have not said much about how SM scheme
equilibration and selection is supported in the brain and other body structures, other
than that we envision the involvement of metastable neuro(body)dynamic patterns. SM
schemes recruit structures distributed across many brain and body regions, involving
different sensory modalities, motor control areas etc. Premotor areas and what are
usually considered higher-level cognitive areas, such as prefrontal cortex, are expected
to contribute to the selection and mutual priming of SM schemes. Thus, the fact that we
find evidence for neural processes in support of the comparator model (see e.g. David
et al. 2008, for a review) does not immediately contradict our proposal. The different
stages of scheme equilibration, selection, and activation may well involve activity in
similar brain areas as those associated with stages of the comparator model. We have
presented our proposal in contrast with the comparator model, which we find neither
necessary nor sufficient for explaining the sense of agency. But we do not claim that
similar neural processes may not support SM schemes and their equilibration. It may
well be that a scheme’s satisfying of the stability condition, for example, may be
implemented through a comparison of different neural signal streams. But such a
comparison would only plays an instrumental role in the more fundamental dynamics
of SM scheme equilibration, which could also occur through different processes.
An important element that we have not addressed in this paper concerns the social
aspects of the sense of agency as well as the constitution of social forms of agency.
While the picture given in this paper is altered in such cases, it changes following along
the same enactive principles, i.e., we do not need to invoke representational explana-
tions or higher forms of inference or simulation (e.g., Leslie et al. 2004; Goldman 2006;
Apperly 2010).
It has been amply demonstrated that in situations of social interaction people
extensively coordinate with each other at various levels, from physiological variables,
posture, distance, gestures, speech acts, and affect (see e.g. Streeck et al. 2011;
Tschacher et al. 2014; Konvalinka et al. 2011; Abney et al. 2014). These coordination
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patterns are part of how individual SM schemes are enacted. Social agency is charac-
terized by what McGann and De Jaegher (2009) call Bself-other contingencies^. Action
and perception in the social domain are a matter of coordinating the behaviours,
emotions, and intentions of the agents involved, in and through the coordination of
movement (including utterances). Self-other contingencies are different from SMCs in
a number of ways. Social interactions are interactions between agents, each of whom is
maintaining their own autonomy. The condition of asymmetry between agent and
environment is more complex (able to change over time along different dimensions),
since the regulation of social interactions is not completely down to either individual
(De Jaegher and Froese 2009). As a consequence, interactions with other social agents
are far less predictable than those with (most) objects. In this way, the equilibration of
SM schemes in interactive situations may not obviously arise from a single agent but
could in principle be co-authored, leading to ambiguities, for instance, like controlling
one’s actions without exerting control (like we described above for the case of repetitive
tasks).
Social forms of agency can also be manifested in solitude. In their enactive approach
to language, Cuffari et al. (2015) distinguish increasingly complex forms of social
agency, from basic coordination in interaction, to partially complementary social acts
(e.g., the act of giving/accepting), to acts of mutual control, mutual and self-interpre-
tation, and social self-control (the application of social regulatory acts to the self, as in
behaviour directed by inner speech). Some of these socially constituted forms of
agency can be manifested in the form of top-down impositions of control and norms.
The reflective sense of agency we have mentioned at the beginning of this paper, which
involves an introspective stance and the explicit conceptual attribution of agency to
myself, as well as narrative skills in some cases, may derive from counterparts of social
skills such as self-interpretation and social self-control described by Cuffari et al. A full
account of the sense of agency in human beings will have to distinguish the biological,
the sensorimotor, and the social forms of agency but also combine them through a core
explanatory continuity.
7 Conclusion
We have interpreted the sensorimotor approach as a world-involving perspective on
action and perception. Lacking a theory of agency, this approach needed to be
supplemented by extending the requirements for agency proposed by enactive theory
– individuality, asymmetry, and normativity – to a new enactive concept of sensori-
motor agency. We have combined this concept with recent formalizations of the notions
of sensorimotor contingencies and their mastery. The latter, based on a dynamical
account of equilibration, furnishes the enactive approach with a proposal for explaining
the sense of agency. Aworld-involving, non-representational, meso-level account based
on how actions and dispositions are organized as a network of precarious, mutually
stabilizing sensorimotor schemes. A given act contributes to the ongoing regeneration
of this organization to different degrees or fails to do so. It is the self-asserting logic of
this network that determines whether an act belongs to the agent or not. Conversely, it is
the ways in which an agent acts in the world that individuate her as the agent she is
constantly becoming.
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This meaningful relation between agent and world that can be established, lost, and
regained, is what in our view best coheres with the phenomenology of the sense of
agency.
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